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Abstract

The African continent provides majority of the world’s raw material for
technology and fine jewelry. Countries dependent on their extractive industries
lag behind on developmental goals. Their GDPs are high as well as their
national poverty levels. This paper explores the factors in which a nation lacks
development when it is financially wealthy to do so. There are similar patterns
in nations where resource curse has occurred. What is the key to sustainable
development in Sub-Saharan Africa? Is solving corruption and migrating away
from a market dependent on primary exports the answer? Can they transition
from the ancient patrimonial state to democracy?

The paper explores the

patterns, the results and perhaps a change.
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Introduction Background:

Do natural resource economies hinder development in Sub-Saharan Africa?
The current works on the subject argue on both sides where resource rich
economies do develop at a lower rate and long-term development is hindered but
also in some other cases natural resource economies are not affected and do not
suffer from under development. The significant difference is in the sampled states.
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the published works tend to lean towards
oil economies having a negative effect on development in places it is needed the
most like tropical Africa. This is evident by looking at economies annual GDP and
also development growth rate. There is evidence of resource abundance that is not
translating into development.

However, in other regions of the world where

abundant resources are present, development is not so much hindered. Such places
are like Brazil, Australia and Norway. So the question then becomes if the same
variable being natural resource economy reacts differently in different states, what
are the other variables in a rentier economy that might perhaps change the
outcome? Current works explore the same questions on what variables are also part
of the concept of resource curse.
In this thesis I hypothesize that there are three factors which hinder
development in resource-rich states: the corrupt nature of many post colonial
states, the value of the commodity to the state (state dependency on the
commodity), and the role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Is the development
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of the state hindered by its patrimonial nature? Is there any correlation between
MNCs involvement and lack of development within oil exporting nations in Africa?
What practices by the State and MNC prevent these host nations from developing
when their GDP is ranked among the highest on the continent?
My interest in these three factors is because each one is connected and
operates together in a resource dependant economy. I place a value on each factor
on this linear equation that results in resource curse. The state is the official
“parent” on all resources within its borders. Any form of exploration and
exploitation is with the states permission. With that being said, there is no resource
contributing to the national GDP without the government knowing about it. The
state takes the role of managing natural resource funds. What happens when the
nature of the state is not so accountable and positive? We start to see negative
behaviors such as mismanagement of resource funds. Corruption becomes a serious
problem for development.
The second variable is the weakness of the economy within a resource
dependent state. Diversity is crucial to any economy to survive shifts in the market.
Natural resource abundant states tend to rely on a commodity and use that as a
main source of income. Any fluctuation in price and demand will have a severe
impact on economies that depend on extractive industries. By not diversifying its
economy, a state cripples its chances of survival in the global market. Also keep in
mind there is the real possibility of the resource abundance slowly dwindling into
non-existence, as it is not renewable. What would be the outcome then when the
main breadwinner of a state no longer exists?

6

Lastly, my third factor is the presence and influence MNCs have on such
resource states. The resource needs to be extracted for use and sale and mostly
they are done so by foreign corporations. This is not to say that they are no state
owned and operated corporations involved in the extraction of natural resources.
However, the state companies are a few compared to the dozen foreign firms that
are part of the puzzle. There is evidence that MNCs are also corrupt along with the
states that they operate in.

Aside from corruption, there is also a lack of

environmental responsibility on behalf of MNCs because the government has no
form of regulations. Granted it is the nations primary duty to protect its borders
and also regulating those working within them but in most MNCs cases, they have
already bought the governments silence and get a blind eye towards most of their
crimes.
To test my hypothesis I will examine Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. I
will layout their history as a patrimonial oil exporting state and the value of oil to
their economy. I will also present the MNC’s history within each country and their
relationship. I will also be looking at their internal government and political
systems. My method of collecting information will be from various sources such as
the World Bank, IMF, UN publications and journals as well as current working
papers in the field of study. The data will include information on levels of
governance, development, commodity dependency and MNCs history and
involvement. I will also be using scholarly writers work within the topic regarding
resource curse cause and effects on development. The last portion of my hypothesis
is beating and rising from resource curse. I will present a case study of Kuwait as an
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oil-exporting nation who has not suffered a resource curse. I will supplement my
recommendation bases on my findings.
Case Studies: In order to support my proposition that three factors hinder
development in resource-rich states; I will employ the case study method. I have
chosen these Sub-Saharan countries because they are in the top ten list of oil
exporting nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and they each have suffered the resource
curse. I will analyze cases from Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Oil exports
account for more than half of the national export revenue. I will also be using Kuwait
as a comparison to analyze why as an oil exporting country Kuwait has not suffered
the resource curse. Kuwait is also a member of OPEC and has been exporting oil
since 1946. Oil exports also account for majority of the national export revenues.
Three Sub-Saharan countries and one Middle Eastern country have similar oil
exporting industries and yet only one of them has not suffered from the resource
curse.
I will first examine Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea’s development
statistics post independence. What measures of state building have taken place? I
will be using development data from the World Bank and UNICEF to gauge the rate
of growth in each case study. There certainly is a rise in national GDP and I want to
be able to see if there is also a rise in human development. My measure for human
development is the rate of poverty and growth out of it. The literatures will also
supplement critiques of failed state management of the oil industry and revenues,
the State as a political entity and its structure in regards to the economy, and the
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MNC’s involvement in general and development as well as oil MNC within Nigeria,
Angola and Equatorial Guinea.
To measure corruption I will use data from Transparency International that
report on levels of corruption by state officials. I define corruption as the act of
committing fraud for personal gain (monetary and/or political). The dependence of
the state on oil can be measured by the GDP of the state and what percentage oil
contributes to overall exports. I will be using global finance reports on the value of
oil to the world and to the home country exporting it. The role of MNCs within the
host nations will be analyzed with informational data collected from human rights
groups
Although I hope to find that all three factors are indeed important, I am also
interested in the varied effects of the factors as they pertain to each of the three
countries. In other words, it may be that one factor is more important than the
others and/or that the priority of these factors differ in different states.
My proposed study is based on the following assumptions. The African
continent is the second largest oil-exporting region in the world next to the Middle
East. According to a Larry Diamond (2013) article “Petroleum to People,” a study
shows that in the coming years there will be approximately $3 trillion of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) pumped into the African economy just from the oil industry.
There are multiple nations that are oil exporters across the continent; however, the
fastest growth in the oil industry is concentrated in West Africa. The West African
oil and gas market was approximately $21.30 billion for the year of 2013 (OPEC). 1
1

OPEC Oil and Gas Market Global Report
9

Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are among the top ten oil producers and
exporters on the continent. Nigeria comes in at first place with 2.2 million barrels
per day. Angola is third with 1.9 million barrels a day and in seventh place is
Equatorial Guinea with 346,000 barrels per day. The largest renewable and nonrenewable natural resources in the world are located on the African continent. The
oil industry generates billions of dollars annually and is anticipated to grow even
larger.
With such abundant resources, countries should flourish based on the
revenues from their exports but many writers have noted a trend which they call a
“curse”. The resource curse refers to the development problems that many nations
with a high dependency on natural resources face. I propose that the Resource curse
results from among other things, three combination factors: the corrupt nature of
many postcolonial states, the value of the commodity to the state and their
dependency on oil and the role of MNCs.
The three major oil producing countries in Africa-- Nigeria, Angola and
Equatorial Guinea- which I have chosen to focus on have suffered the resource curse
as a result of their oil dependency. The resource curse stems from corruption and
lack of governance on a state level, lack of corporate responsibility from MNCs and
the economic dependency on oil.
Angola has a population of 21.47 million and an annual GDP of $124.20
billion. According to the World Bank 60 percent of the rural community lives at
poverty levels.
2

2

Angola is one of the wealthiest nations on the continent.

Oil

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
10

exports make up 95 percent of the total exports and 45 percent of the annual GDP.
Yet Angola remains underdeveloped. Over 36 percent of the overall population lives
in poverty.3
Nigeria has a population of 178.5 million and an annual GDP of $521.8 billion
according to the World Bank.4 It is also noted that 46 percent of the population lives
in poverty. According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
the oil and gas sector accounts for 35 percent of the national GDP and represents 90
percent of the export revenue. Levels of corruption are high in Nigeria centered on
missing funds and bribery. According to a New York Times article $20 billion from
oil sales went unaccounted for from the national bank. When the head of the
Nigerian Central Bank investigated, he was fired from his position. 5
Equatorial Guinea’s annual GDP was $15.57 billion for the year 2013, oil
represents 95 percent of the gross domestic product. The country has a small
population of just over 757,014. According to a Larry Diamond’s article “Petroleum
to People” 3 out of 4 Equatorial Guineans live under $2 a day.6 However, President
Obiang’s family and anyone tied to the Obiangs have amassed fortunes at the
expense of the state.

There are high levels of corruption that led to the U.S

Department of Justice to seize property belonging to Teodoro Nguema Obiang
Mangue, the oldest son of president Obiang in Malibu, California in October 2011. 7
http://data.worldbank.org/country/angola
http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria
5 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/world/africa/nigerians-ask-why-oilfunds-are-missing.html?_r=0
6 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139647/larry-diamond-and-jackmosbacher/petroleum-to-the-people
.7 Ibid
3
4
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All three nations are not fully democratic states. State governance in Africa
tends to be patrimonial for the most part. This is not to say there are no democratic
nations on the continent, but there are more states that are patrimonial than
democratic. After independence, Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea had their
fair share of unstable governments. There was a scramble for power and elites who
came to power already had prominent positions during colonial rule and once
colonization ended, they became presidents and prime ministers. Elites rising to
such levels of leadership can be described as patrimonial.

This behavior and

relation between state officials and their method of governing has a patron/clientele
relationship in the new decolonized neo-patrimonial Africa.
The resource curse is more prevalent in neo-patrimonial states. There is a
correlation between the level of good governance and development achievements
on the African continent. The state is the main public administrator and is
responsible for developing the economy within its borders and also protecting state
and private assets.

In neo-patrimonial states, there is a disconnect between

compliance and accountability. As they are un-democratic, there have been cases in
each selected nations where oil revenues have been mismanaged. State officials
often become corrupt and use natural resource revenues for their personal gain
rather than the wealth and development of a nation. It is also been demonstrated
that bribes and pay offs have been accepted from foreign investment companies for
access to the natural resource.8

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-05-01/long-war-againstcorruption
8
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Natural resources such as oil are mainly extracted and exported by various
multinational corporations (MNCs) that have struck a deal with the government.
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is an important part of a growing economy,
especially one that is emerging and is in need of capital. Multinational corporations
bring a tremendous amount of capital into the host nations. However, there is a
question about their role in development. Most of the MNCs are located in the
western world and their FDI is directed towards the “Global South” which is the
developing world that has the largest amount of growth potential and profit.
Multinational corporations in sectors such as technology and textiles bring capital
growth and development to the host nations. However, in the oil sector the outcome
is often the opposite. The amount of money that is pumped into the nations is
almost double if not triple that of other sectors. Oil is the most contested sector
because aside from being a high commodity item on the global market, it comes with
high risks.
Apart from environmental problems such as oil spills, MNCs have had to deal
with security issues in certain countries where oil pipelines and refineries are at
risk. Nigeria experienced both a terrible oil spill in 2011 and difficulty securing the
oil pipelines from rebels.

Angola and Equatorial Guinea suffer from serious

corruption. These two nations are the wealthiest states in Africa, but due to
corruption there are records of millions of dollars worth of oil revenue receipts
missing.
Before moving on to deal with my hypothesis, I will provide a theoretical
framework based on relevant literature on neo-patrimonialism and democracy.

13

14

Literature Review:
Resource curse is the negative relationship between resource dependence
and economic growth. The theory is that natural resource abundant economies
grow at a slower rate than the resource lacking economies. It is also referred to as
the Dutch Disease. There is the question of whether resource curse only appears in
developing states or travels further than such states. The basic framework is that
countries that are heavily dependant on natural resource exports develop at a
slower rate because other sectors of their economy become depreciated and loose
value. Such dependant economies shy away from developing their manufacturing
sector. Sachs and Warner (1995) insist that resource curse is the result of the Dutch
Disease theory and dismiss the possibility that oil corporations and the political
natures of the state contribute to the oil resource curse.
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) explore the theory that the cause of resource
curse in resource abundant is the state’s adaption to a sudden boom. They state that
nations are living beyond their means with newfound wealth that is not renewable
and steady. They label it as an “unsustainable high income”. Income that will soon
decrease at any moments notice due to fluctuation in demand (oil prices) and
supply that is not renewable. They conclude that selling goods at market price and
investing the revenues to later survive off the interest of revenues reduces the
chances of a curse rather than effectively blowing through the revenues.
Among other theories on resource curse and its cause, there are several
theoretical works on escaping the curse. To escape, one must diagnose the issue and
either avoid the defect or correct it for the future. The most common theory on
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beating the resource curse draws upon the political nature of the state. What affects
does the institution have on the economic outcome?
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) explore the roles institutions play in
resource curse. They identify that the institution is a primary actor in the big picture
of resource curse. They examine the institutional arrangements of states that have
“growth winner” versus “growth losers”. They examine Botswana who is a resource
exporting state. Botswana has diamond exports that account for 40% of the GDP
but due to a “good institution” in place, Botswana performs well and is not affected
by any resource abundance. 9 Botswana is therefore listed as a growth winner. They
refer to Ades and Di Talla (1999) to shed light on how resource rents may stimulate
corruption among politicians and bureaucrats. If there is no good institution in
place, corruption on high levels is a reality rather than a theory. Based on their
models, it is concluded that the quality of institution plays a great role in resource
curse. Unlike Sachs and Warner that do not assign any value to institutions in
resource curse, Mehlum, Moene, Torvil predict that resource curse can be
eliminated entirely if institutions played a positive role by maintaining an
accountable reputation. The Dutch Disease story simply wouldn’t apply.
If the performance of an institution has an effect on resource curse, what
about leaders within the institution, what effects do they have on resource curse?
Institutions are shaped and run by leaders and Cunningham and Casceli (2009)
examine the multiple layers that leaders have within an institution and how they
each relate to the resource curse. They set up their hypothesis by asking the many
9

Mehlun, Moene, Torvil (2006) “Institutions and Resource Curse”
16

ways that resource rents can alter the incentives of a political leader. In order to
understand the outcome one must understand the start-- which is the leader’s
behavior.
They make two simple categories of centralized and decentralized
mechanisms. The centralized mechanism is with a leader that is the recipient of
resource revenues and benefits directly from it. The problem comes when its time
to decide whether to allocate money into investments that can enrich the country or
retain the money to remain in power. The patrimonial leader would follow this
model and choose self-enrichment over national development. The arrangement for
collecting resource through the government and its ability and incentives to make
the most of the revenue determine the resource curse.

10

the repressive leader, fatalistic leader, and patronage.

Other models tested are
Each one resulted in a

variation of resource curse. In patronage, resource was likely and at a higher rate.
There is an increase in rent resource while a decrease in social investments. There is
also the need to remain in power and power is bought with state revenues.
“Is neo-patrimonialism a pathology, analogy, cause, effect or a term for all of
Africa’s troubles?” This is the question that Ann Pitcher, Mary H. Moran and Michael
Johnson try to answer in their paper Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa. Can the nature of the state be the initial point for all the
problems the nation endures? Their paper defines what the common definition and
use of “patrimonial” is when labeling a state as neo-patrimonial. The association of
patrimonial Africa is not the same as Weber’s patrimonialism. Weber’s (1947)
10

Cunningham and Casceli (2009). “Leader Behavior and resource Curse” p.633
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definition referred to the patron and client like relationship between leaders and
subjects in a political system. Weber also describes the distribution of power is
based on culture.11 Today, patrimonial has the stigma of “corrupt” attached to it.
Neo-patrimonial refers to the same guidelines listed by Weber but it is assigned to
leaders post decolonization, the new patrimonial.
The construction of authority and the lack of accountability politically affect
the state and social welfare of its people. Pitcher and her colleagues find that states
that are not associated/labeled with neo-patrimonial leaders often experience
higher rates of development versus those states with neo-patrimonial practices by
their leaders.
There is a collection of “democratic” states in Africa and they all have their
shortcomings as neo-patrimonial states. They are democratic in a sense, even
though they are not liberal democracies. Rod Alence (2004) makes a comparison in
between the level of development and the governance of political institutions in
Sub-Saharan Africa. 12 He analyzed a variety of nations where some are considered
fairly liberal as well as less restrictive governments like Botswana’s and states that
are less democratic and more restrictive like Angola and Nigeria. Allence finds that
there is a positive relationship between states with relatively good governance and
public administration and the level of development nationally. States with good
governance are likely to be more transparent than those that are not practicing good
governance. So, such “good” states are likely to experience higher development rates
Pitcher and Moran (2009) “Rethinking Patriomonialism and Neo-patrimonialism
in Africa” p. 126
12 Rod Alence. 2004. “Political Institutions and Development Governance in SubSaharan Africa.”
11
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since they are more accountable in their public administration. The opposite is also
true where there is likely to be low development in countries with more restrictive
and non-democratic governments.

A neo-patrimonial state lacks the proper

governance in public administration, which in turn negatively affects the economic
and political stability of the country. The stability measures that Alence used are:
economic policy coherence, public service effectiveness and limited corruption.
Nations that were identified as “less restrictive” dealt with less corruption.
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) generally aids in regional economic growth.
According to Kevin N. Lumbila he indicates that American FDI increased to $148
billion for the year 2000 compared to only $ 32 billion in 1980.
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However, Africa

received little in comparison to other regions within the years 1980-2000. He
primarily explores the effect FDI has had on other regions like Asia and Latin
America and how FDI actually worked in promoting development and economic
growth that attracted further investments. When the same comparison was made,
he found that Africa is the one region that is still in poverty. According to Jeffrey
Sachs (2004), thirty-three Sub-Saharan African countries have more than half of
their population still living under $1 a day.

14

In overview FDI in Africa doesn’t have the same positive outcomes as in
other regions of the world. The investments are there but they somehow do not
translate into higher economic development. Lumbila explores how FDI works in
Africa. His study finds that aid boosts growth in regions where there is a “good
Kevin N. Lumbila. 2005. “What Makes FDI Work? A Panel Analysis of the Growth
Effect of FDI in Africa.”
13
14

19

policy environment.”15

Meaning perhaps that there is some level of good

governance within the host country. Transparency on the state level directly affects
the growth of the states especially via FDI. The investments can eventually translate
into measurable development achievements.
Development in Africa has lagged behind other continents for many years.
Unlike other economies, Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled economically. Postcolonial Africa’s GDP per capita in 1992 was approximately equivalent to that of
Western Europe in 1820.16 The African continent has been disenfranchised from
the dawn of ships landing on her shores. From mass transportation of people for
slavery, to being colonized and used as an extractive wealth for the European
empire. Sachs and Bloom point out that Africa started out in the global industrial
and economic race with multiple strikes against it. From colonial rule, slave trading,
to weak institutions post-colonialism, ethnic division, geography (most tropical land
concentration in the world), corruption and heavy dependence on primary exports.
The slow growth in Africa can be determined by using any of the factors listed above
as part of a larger picture that is the complex African economy.
In researching for development, the paper will use the general principals laid
out by the World Bank Development indicators. What I will be measuring is the rate
of poverty, literacy and life expectancy. Bloom and Sachs (1998) use six factors of

Kevin N. Lumbila. 2005. “What Makes FDI Work? A Panel Analysis of the Growth
Effect of FDI in Africa.”
16 Bloom and Sachs. 1998. “Geography Demography, and Economics Growth in
Africa”
15
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development that affect the Sub-Saharan African countries.17 For the purpose of this
paper, I have three of six factors laid out by Sachs. The three basic aspects of
development I will use to examine the sampled countries are: poverty, literacy and
life expectancy. Sachs states that countries with development issues in Africa suffer
negatively from those three factors. My reason for selecting these factors over the
other is because they are also the three measured factors in development. When
researching data for development poverty margin, mortality rate and education
enrollment are always the top indicators of social improvement or decline
depending on the presented/collected data. The other factors were internal politics,
economic politics and external conditions (i.e. colonization and slave trade).
Poverty is high while GDP per capita is also unusually high than normal. Life
expectancy is shorter due to lack of proper medical care. Literacy rate is also lower
because most children are unable to continue in school past primary to assist family
in need.

It is not to say that there hasn’t been improvements in the rate of

development since the end of colonial rule however, the progress made is far behind
than the expected growth with the available wealth on the continent. Other nations
located in Asia and South America also suffered from the history of colonialism and
tropical climates and yet they have managed to attain a sustainable method of
development.
The prospect of development seems to lie in the balance between
transparency and good governance. Achille Toto-Same (2008) explains and lays out
the economic history of Equatorial Guinea before and after oil became a major
Bloom and Sachs. 1998. “Geography, Demography, and Economics Growth in
Africa”
17
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revenue earner of the state. After independence, the state was extremely poor and
mainly relied on fishing and agriculture as the main export. Mobil Oil started
exporting oil in August of 1996.18 Since then the GDP of Equatorial Guinea has shot
up, yet the main population remains at a poverty level. Toto-Same explores the
theory of the Dutch Disease. The phenomenon refers to the boom and bust cycle that
is caused by an increase in exploitation of natural resources that causes the decline
in agriculture and manufacturing. As Equatorial Guinea moves forward with oil
production that accounts for over 90 percent of exports, will other sectors develop?
What does this mean for the average citizen that is not in the oil industry.
Toto-Same correlates lack of development in Equatorial Guinea with two
main factors, lack of governance and Dutch Disease. The over development in the oil
sector makes other non-oil exports less competitive and the majority of the human
labor (about 80 percent)19 is in the non-oil sector. Since the oil industry is the main
and largest source of state revenue, any mismanagement of funds will affect
development. This eventually leads to what is known as the “resource curse.”
The resource curse is a phenomenon that seems to be taking hold of
oil/mineral exporting states in Africa. The value of the commodity in the world
market and the dependence of the State impact the resource curse. Precious
resources such as oil are extracted and exported by multinational corporations
(MNCs) operating within the host country.

Emeka Duruigbo explores the

relationship between MNCs and the resource curse in Africa. In her report “The
Achille Toto-Same. 2008. “ Mineral- Rich Countries and Dutch Disease:
Understanding the Macroeconomic Implications of Windfalls and the Development
Prospects.”
19 Ibid – Achille Toto-Same 2008.
18
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World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa”, she
finds a correlation between MNCs and lack of development in high exporting
countries. Oil rich countries ultimately experience extreme poverty, civil wars,
human rights abuse and environmental degradation.20 She explores the role
institutions play in facilitating this. The report states that the combination of poor
leadership by the State and MNCs with less than honorable agendas facilitate the
resource curse. There is a lack of accountability and transparency on both sides,
states and MNCs.
Nicholas Shaxson (2007) brings forward the common notion before 1990’s
that oil companies were the new imperial power taking advantage of Africa. He
presents that since OPEC’s rise in 1970’s, oil exporters like Nigeria held larger
revenues from oil companies than before. This stark reality slowly restored the
image of foreign oil companies as non-threatening.

Exxon Mobil spokesman

Andre´Madec was quoted for saying “we don’t like to call it oil curse. We prefer to
call it a governance curse.”

21Governance

may have increased and each state has a

larger stake on oil revenues, however it doesn’t exonerate any MNC from their
crimes. Shaxson (2007) also quotes Martin Wolf a Financial Times commentator:
“In a society when everyone cheats and takes or pays bribes, there’s little
incentive not to join in.”

Emeka Duruigbo. (2005 )“ The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the
Resource Curse in Africa.”
21 Shaxson (2007), “ Oil, Corruption , the Resource Curse”
20
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Foreign firms are participants in the grand scheme of corruption as the politicians
they bribe.

Corrupt politicians have a price and its called corruption and oil

companies pay to get their piece of the pie.
Surprisingly, there isn’t much work on the theory that MNCs are also part
takers in resource curse. There is an abundant collection of work theorizing that the
resource curse is the cause of a single, not diverse and weakened economy along
with corruption on a state level. However, there are few discussions on possibly
assigning some responsibility to foreign corporations. After all, they are present to
extract the resource and gain a substantial amount of wealth. Why is it presumed
that they are innocent by standers and are simply there to perform a task under the
watchful eye of the state. The nature of the state is corrupt therefore the nature of
business conducted with MNCs is more than likely to be corrupt too. In most cases
that will be presented later on, MNCs are as corrupt as the leaders in the countries
they operate in. There is evidence of bribery, illegal drilling license purchase and
even financing civil wars.
Duruigbo uses data from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) to show that petroleum exporting countries have a lower rate of
development than their counter part non-oil exporting nations. They also are more
likely to endure civil wars and conflicts. These states also spend less on social
welfare development programs but spend almost ten times more on military and
security forces around oil resource locations. 22

22

Ibid-- Emeka Duruigbo. (2005 )
24

The article calls for transparency by MNCs and host nations in monitoring oil
revenues. Duruigbo insists on the creation of trust funds and public reports of the
use of funds to reduce the levels of corruption. MNCs would be obligated to show
what they are paying for since there are reports of payments being made to state
officials for favorable oil deals. There would be a full accountability of oil revenues
and disclosures of oil receipts, which would contribute to proper use of funds.
There seems to be subtle correlations between Multinational Corporations
and lack of development. E.D Oruonye suggests that the resource curse is brought
on by increased globalization that brings an MNC into a host nation. Oruonye states
that globalization has spread foreign investments and foreign firms to various SubSaharan African countries23. These MNCs in turn over exploit the land and violate
indigenous people’s human rights. Oruoyne examines in his paper the
environmental impacts that are caused by activities of oil companies in Sub-Sahara
Africa.
Oruonye states that most Sub-Saharan environmental degradation can be
linked to the negative contributions of oil MNCs,24 which in turn increases poverty
in the region. He samples a few states to analyze environmental degradation.
Oruonye finds in Nigeria that the greenhouse gas emissions in the region are caused
by gas flaring in the area from the process of oil exploration. Also ancient oil
pipelines lack maintenance and break down causing massive oil spills in the Niger
delta. As a result of the environment becoming toxic, residents are unable to live in
E.D. Oruonye. 2012. “Multinational Oil Corporations in Sub Sahara Africa: An
Assessment of the Impacts of Globalization.”
24 Ibid - E.D. Oruonye. 2012.
23
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the area as resources dwindle and livelihoods are threatened. There are many
documented civil strife cases that are brought up in the paper to show that oil
companies and military/security forces (on behalf of the state and MNC) go to
extreme measures to protect their investments.
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The Neo-patrimonial State and Governance
The State: Patrimonial Relations

Decolonization took place in the 60’s and 70’s for most African nations but
there are some countries that gained their independence much later such as the 80’s
and so forth. The old colonial system left a political gap with old institutions in
place. Colonial institutions were established to benefit the colonial empires and
never to develop and sustain the colony. The purpose of the colonies was for
extraction of raw materials that are then sent to Europe and made into marketable
and profitable goods. The profits benefitted the imperial rulers rather than to
improve the colonies.
Decolonization took place but the political and governmental institutions
remained the same except there was no colonial rule.

The colonial rule had

established a patronage relationship within the state. Patronage on state level had
already been a fostered idea and a known way of governing for colonies. When it
came time to lead, leaders that filled in the shoes as statesman also inherited and
perfected patrimonialism. Generally, those that were considered to have some sort
of key figure during colonial rule or educated nationals rose to power. Some leaders
were even Western educated and hard nationalists, which made for future state
leaders after colonization ended.
Post independence most African nations battled through dictatorship,
autocrats, one party regimes and military takeovers. The neo-patrimonial leader by
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most scholars is described as being uniquely an African form of political leadership.
Leaders have a more personal and patron/client like connections to their immediate
subjects. In such cases corruption is likely to occur since there is no accountability
being monitored and checked because all subjects are benefiting on the side from
the politician in office. With weak institution and corrupt leaders, the state is bound
for crisis and turmoil. There is little development and progress in terms of the
average citizen who struggles to live even in poverty. It is not to say corruption
doesn’t exist in the Global North, however it is manageable to the point where the
majority of society is able to not feel the effects of corruption within a country.
In the global south, corruption on a state level directly affects the
development of the nation and the farewell of its citizens. The reason being is that
the developing world is just that - developing and not fully equipped to support its
entire population on a system. The system is broken and remains broken until
leaders sacrifice personal gain for national gain.
Angola gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. Once colonialism was
over, there was a race for power between three primary groups. The Popular
Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and a small faction called the National Liberation
front of Angola (FNLA). The FNLA group eventually dissolved into UNITA as they
held little numbers. The next 27 years were plagued by a civil war waged out by
MPLA troops and UNITA soldiers. Current president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos was
the leader of the MPLA front, who beat out Jonas Savimbi in a “legitimate election”
on September in 1992. The opposition and their supporters didn’t feel it was a
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legitimate win so another civil war broke out after elections that lasted until 2002.
Wars that span almost three decades long robbed Angola of any chance at
prosperity in its infant postcolonial state. Small opposition would rise and Dos
Santos would suppress competition by having radio stations and the Internet shut
down. Dos Santos has remained in office since 1979. Eventually, China invested
about $5 billion to rebuild Angola’s infrastructure that was destroyed in both civil
wars. According to Stephanie Hanson, she reports that in 2004 Global Witness
investigated and found that $1.7 billion was un-accounted for between 1997-2001.25
Dos Santos polices in office can be described as patrimonial. He appoints and
replaces anyone in any government position.
Corruption is not un-common in Angola’s as well as other nations. There is
evidence of bribery using oil and other extractive industries revenues. It is alleged
that former UNITA members in office are paid of $15,000 a month in bribes from the
official MPLA party, Dos Santos camp.26 Dos Santos benefits directly from the oil
market. The revenue from Sonangol, the state owned oil company, provides the
capital to buy off alliance and favorable terms. Also some political figures have a
stake into the company, as well as his eldest daughter who now manages Sonangol
and makes her one of the wealthiest African woman. His public policies are far less
from improving the current circumstances and possible prosperous future of
Angola. Instead, top officials are paid off from lucrative sign on bonuses from oil
companies. More than 50 % of the government budget is spent on military. 27 It is
Stepahinie Hanson. “Angola’s Political and Economic Development”
Munslow. Politics of Unsustainable Development in Angola
27 Ibid
25
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proven throughout history that corrupt states spend a fortune on their military and
external forces.
Equatorial Guinea is the only Spanish colony in Africa. In 1968, what was
known as Spanish Guinea gained its independence and became known as Equatorial
Guinea. Francisco Macias Nguema became the first president. His career began as a
junior level officer in the Spanish colonial administration. His rise to power should
be no surprise as he already had experience under colonial rule so its only natural
such an elite and favored by the former colonial empire takes head of state once
colonization ended. Once Francisco got into office, he soon started appointing his
own family members to key positions within the new government. The term
Neguemism was born --a rule by a small family elite. 28
Geoffrey Wood goes on to explain the devastations that took place once
Macias was in office. Macias totalitarian rule completely neglected governmental
functions. Education, internal security and the economy crashed. The majority of the
population was forced to go back to subsistence farming. According Wood at one
point the expulsion of Nigerian migrant workers led to a 90 percent drop in GNP.
Also at least one third of the population in Equatorial Guinea had either been killed
or exiled. 29
In 1979, after a decade of civil strife, a coup took place with the lead of
Teodor Obiang Nguema who was the Commander of the National Guard. He also
happens to be Macias own nephew. Obiang overthrew his uncle and took power.
Geoffery Wood, 2004. “ Business and Politics In a Criminal State: The case of
Eq.Guinea” pp 548
29 Ibid
28
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The alleged last straw for Obiang to rise up against his uncle is the murder of his
brother by his uncle Macias. Macias had become paranoid and taken exile in his
home village during his last years. In that time, he allegedly murdered his own
nephew. Obiang promised to end the Macias reign of excess years. Unfortunately,
rather than end that, he too became a totalitarian leader. Obiang is still in office
today. Though the constitution was amended to allow multiple party competitions
in 1980, there are only few political groups that are legal (some are banned) in the
country and allowed to participate. However, corruption regarding elections is high.
In December 2002 an election was held and it seemed as though that Obiang won
97% of votes. The opposition Celestino Bacale withdrew amid threats. 30
Obiang continues to rule and divides up governmental positions between his
family members. His son Teodorin is the minister of Forestry, while his other son
Gabriel is head of Mining and Energy. This is a classic example of the “patron” like
preferential treatment patrimonial leaders practice.
In 1960, Nigeria gained its independence from Britain. The Northern elite
and southern regions began to dispute on military corps appropriation that would
lead into a three-year civil war. The north wanted a larger assignment of military
corps based on sheer size unlike the south that felt it should be 50/50. The Nigerian
military rose to power in 1966. Soon after an ethnic division based on region took
place. The Biafra states (Eastern regions) were born as they seceded from Nigeria.
As a result, a civil war broke out that lasted from 1967-1970. It is estimated that
more than 500 thousand people lost their lives in the Biafran war. The first military
30

Ibid
31

government was under General Ironsi. He was known to have his “kinsmen” as his
advisors. As a result of this accusation he didn’t last long in power. Following the
civil war in between the regions, General Gowen took power. During his time,
Nigeria was able to expand her sector socially and economically using oil revenues.
The patrimonial practice became evident and embedded into the society. According
to Ipke, Gowon had numerous post-war contracts with specific foreign businessmen
that resulted in large kickbacks. 31
Gowon’s rule ended

in 1976 due to a coup that was led by Murtala

Muhammad. According to history, Muhammad was a product of Gowon’s patronage
regime. He was a principal actor in the 1966 coup to restore Northern dominance.
The zeal of Muhammad only lasted six months in power. He appointed his successor
General Olusegun Obasanjo who was supposed to follow the “anti corruption motto”
of Muhammad. However, Obasanio created organizations such as the Festival of
Black and African Arts to restore the old patronage route as well as universities and
schools. After Obasanio, Babangida took power in 1985. He was known for buying
large powerful groups for support. Locally, this arrangement became known as
“settlement”. During his regime, he would depose of any officer in doubt of their
loyalty and support. His family lavished in immense wealth. His wife was reportedly
worth $8 million while he was worth $30 million.
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Among other things he has

given numerous licenses to “client’s” to export crude oil illegally.
In 1996, Abiola Abacha won the presidential election. He surrounded himself only
with very few loyalists he trusted. It is reported that several major state contracts
31
32
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were awarded to none other than his children. Though Nigeria has elections, it
seems as though the same type of patrimonial leaders are elected and take office.
State is the initial point where resource curse and lack of development takes
shape. It is the first of the three conditions for resource curse. My reason for stating
this is that every place in Africa where some sort of resource curse has occurred,
you can find a very week state with old institution that can not accommodate the
ever changing needs of the extractive business. You will also find the resource is
some form of mineral, oil or gas. According Hazel Mc Ferson, hyper-corrupt
countries are associated with an abundant supply in mineral wealth.
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extractive industry has been a major part of resource curse within the African
continent. There is a lack of proper governance and accountability, which leads to
higher corruption. The state doesn’t tax its population and therefore has little
incentive to remain accountable and far from corruption. The extractive industries
make up for more than half of the revenues of Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial
Guinea. State leaders and those participating in the oil or extracted raw material
business, tend to become corrupted and rule in a neo-patrimonial fashion. As
pointed out, there is evidence of political payoffs for support and use of state funds
for personal gain.
Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea all have officials that are considered
neo-patrimonial. Patrimonial practices can be found not only across the African
continent but also globally.
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It is not exclusive to Africa, however the neo-

McFerson. 2009. “ Governance and Hyper-corruption is Resource rich Africa”
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patrimonial practices by African leaders along with other conditions lead to a weak
and vulnerable state for resource curse to take place.
Scholars like Theobald, as referenced by Pitcher & Moran, have linked public
administrations within neo-patrimonial states have lower development growth rate.
According to Pitcher and Moran (2009), Theobald and Budd (1982) indicate that
patrimonial states are less likely to have fundamental development growth
economically and politically. The main reason for these occurrences is that state
officials often misappropriate state funds towards personal enrichment rather than
internal investments into the state institutions like education, healthcare and job
training. The state in turn is less likely to develop when social conditions have not
been improved upon and the present institution lacks the power to enforce any
form of accountability. All three countries are publicly known to have had leaders
that have used national wealth to increase their personal wealth. In Angola and
Equatorial Guinea, the ruling party family has become extremely wealthy from state
owned oil revenues. In Nigeria, state officials are known to receive kickbacks in
exchange for a spotty oil contracts with MNCs.
The state is a governing body over its sovereign borders and citizens. The
economy and the development of the country are one of the many duties for any
state. Proper governance is extremely important in these two sectors because lack
there of leads into a financially weak and underdeveloped state. So how does lack of
good governance lead a nation into resource curse? The answer would be it is
because of corruption and lack of accountability that robs a nation of its wealth and
leads its natural blessings into a curse.
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Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are well known for their abundance of
oil and as a result are large producers on the worlds oil market. Their annual income
from oil exports are extremely high and yet, each state has lagged in development
and suffers from resource curse. Those in office have not been held accountable for
oil revenue receipts and management of state funds.
Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea all have a known reputation for being
corrupted countries. From their top officials such as their presidents to others in
office have been known to be corrupt. According to Transparency International’s
2014 corruption Index, Angola scored higher than Nigeria on levels of public sector
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia being the highest and Botswana as the
least corrupted in Africa. Corruption in public sectors robs the economic growth
and development of a nation and leaves its people in poverty.

Development

requires capital and when funds are mismanaged and disappear with no
accountability, the population suffers.
Rod Alence compares states that are restricted, non-democratic and
democratic states. He uses this guideline to also measure the rate of development
within each section. I am not here to argue whether or not democracy should be
adapted by African states. What I am merely trying to prove is that states that are
more restricted or patrimonial and have an abundant resource that can translate
into state wealth, often lack development and some even experience civil wars. In
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Alence experiment, Nigeria fell under and non-democratic category while Angola
and Guinea Bissau fell under “restricted”34.
Nigeria a “restricted” state is far from democratic and is also very rich in oil
and gas resources. The combinations of those two lead to resource curse due to lack
of good governance and the value of the commodity as well. Nigeria also relies
heavily on its oil and gas exports as it makes up more than 75% of the economy.
Angola is fairly new to their sudden wealth of oil unlike Nigeria. Alence lists
Angola under restricted. Restricted is explained as a restrictive government. Angola
has a GDP of $124.2 billion35 and oil has made it extremely wealthy, however the
conditions of people’s lives are nowhere near improved. In fact they are declining
and as a result, Angola receives aid money from the World Bank. The paradox of a
wealthy nation receiving aid is interesting. It forces you to ask yourself where does
the money go.
Though most states in Africa are patrimonial, not all suffer from resource
curse with their commodities.

Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) indentify

perhaps why resource curse hasn’t affected Botswana even as a patrimonial state.
The reason lies within the commodity and governance. Botswana, aside from
diamonds, is also an agriculture state like cattle and has a robust tourism economy.
They do have diamond deposits but according the Economist (2009) 36, the
diamonds are located deep underground and require time and large financial
investments that would only pay out in the long term. Debsawna (state partnership
Rod Alence. 2004. “Political Institutions and Development Governance in SubSaharan Africa.” P.171
35 http://data.worldbank.org/country/angola
36 http://www.economist.com/node/14707287
34
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with De Beers) has closed down its diamond mines leaving out a gap in this specific
extractive industry in Botswana. Botswana is in turn faced with turning to other
exports to keep the economy going and GDP up. Granted there was a 40 percent
slump as a result of the mines being closed, a resource curse never occurred.
Botswana has not suffered from any resource curse because their commodity
is valued differently and the availability of it is also getting smaller. Their economy
is no longer solely reliant on their income from their extractive industries. They
have managed to cultivate and develop other sectors of their market such as
agriculture and tourism through reserve and game parks. Botswana is also a fairly
less corrupt state according to Transparency International (TI) 2014 Corruption
Index publication. Their government manages to be accountable towards its people.
Rod Alence also listed Botswana as a fairly democratic state. The status of the state
and the level of its “good governance” proves to have an effect on the outcome of its
economic and social development. Governments have to do their duties of being
reliable, accountable for the sake of its own fate and the people. If the few elites
benefit and the rest of the population suffers, it is only a matter of time before
severe hardships and poverty incite conflict to break out. The overall national
development is also lower.
Patrimonial states are weak and lack the formal institutions and will power
that would normally serve as a monitoring agency to deter corruption. However, it
is based on old colonial patronage/clientele system and therefore continues to fail in
the modern post-colonial era. Corruption will always exist on a certain level,
however when it is the state that is corrupt then the ripple effects spread out far and
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wide. Leaders would have to refrain from activities that would be seen as corrupt
practices for personal gain and seek national gain and development through good
and clean governance. Transparency is key to good governance. All state revenues
from exports should be made public as well as the assets that are held by those in
office. State officials tend to have shareholders stakes in state owned companies.
For those share holders in office, personal assets are sometimes mixed in with state
profits. An example would be from Angola, where public officials held shares in a
state oil company named Nazaki according to Forbes magazine.37 By holding such
major shares in a state oil company, officials were able to profit off the revenues.
Transparency International recommends the publishing of revenues deter
corruption as the knowledge is available to the public and the government would
have the public’s scrutiny.
A check and balance system is important for any government to keep
themselves in check. One branch cannot supervise or inspect itself, rather another
branch would report unbiased to its own interests. A nation cannot move forward
without having a strong government. The nation state begins at the governmental
level and it is the foundation of any stable and well functioning sovereign nation.
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Commodity Value
Value to the State and Dependency

Equatorial Guinea as a former Spanish colony relied on the Cocoa industry to
provide for the economy. Cocoa production accounted for about 75% of the GDP
prior to independence.38 Once Macias took office and led a 10-year terror on the
country, the nation had lost civilians due to war or exile. The Cocoa industry
plummeted and the Economy crashed in 1976 under Macias. Oil exploration took
place first in 1967 by US Mobil, but it didn’t prove to be successful. In the 1980’s a
Spanish company drilled in the same area as Mobil and was successful. By the
1990’s Equatorial Guinea became a known producer in the oil and gas market.
Further oil exploration took place with Mobil in 1995 and struck oil with a daily
production of 40,000 barrels/day, that would later grow to 190,000 barrels/per
day. 39 Once oil was discovered the government favored the industry due to its high
cash output potential and went onwards with being an oil economy.
After the two civil wars, Angola lost most agriculture infrastructures and
also man power. About half of the population was under the age of fifteen after the
war.40 The war had taken its toll. Relying on agriculture to boost the economy was
hopeless and there was no one to farm it. Angola was a major coffee exporter under
Portuguese colonial rule. Aside from coffee, Angola also exported maize. It exported
approximately 400,00MT of maize annually and was the world’s fourth largest
Frynas. 2004. “The Oil Boom in Equatorial Guinea.” P 528
Ibid
40 Hanson. 2008. “Angola’s Political and Economic Development.”
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coffee exporter prior to independence in 1975. 41 The first oil exploration took place
in 1955 with French company Total. However oil didn’t have the same impact as it
does now until after the 1980’s. Oil contract signing bonuses and advances provided
quick capital that the government can use. Oil receipts also have dominated and
make up for most of the GDP while agriculture that once was the main revenue
source is down to almost zero. Oil slowly became the preferred export and what
accounts for most of the national GDP.
Nigeria is the oldest oil exporter of the three nations. Nigeria isn’t new to the
oil league. Discovery of oil in Nigeria began in 1950. The oil economy in Nigeria has
played a significant part in politics. During the 1967-1970 civil war, ethnic groups
struggled for control of the oil economy. Once the war ended, Nigeria was able to
recover from the war solely based on oil receipts. The world oil shock followed by a
boom and bust phenomenon took place in between the 1973’s and the 1990’s.
Nigeria was able to profit from the high demands and cost of oil at this time as a
result of being a member of OPEC. However, with the bust cycle, and the
mismanagement of oil funds, the economy suffered. Nigeria artificially devalued the
Nira in order to alleviate the pressure and also subsidized oil for domestic use. In
this time frame, more and more cocoa farmers were leaving their farms and headed
to urban cities for economic opportunities.
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agriculture sector decreased and

the reliance on oil increased.

Kyle. 2005. “The Political Economy of Angolan Growth: Social and Regional
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The importance of the commodity to the state and its importance on the
global market play as the second part to cause resource curse. The value of the
resource on the global market is very important. The level of importance will be
determined by the assigned price and the availability. How many demands do we
have and how many can we supply at a certain rate? The oil, gas and mineral
sectors are valued highly across the global market. Oil supply has always been a
contested subject since before the Gulf war. We live in a world where we need oil
because most things need oil to function. Though there is a new path for less oil
dependency, oil and gas are still a necessity in the modern world. Oil then becomes
a widely desired commodity and therefore its value rises on the world market.
The value of a commodity to a state varies slightly from those of the global
market. Developing states recognize that the commodity in question is their main
“bread winner” for their economy. The national GDP relies heavily on the export of
this one commodity. This commodity tends to be in extractive minerals for most
Sub-Saharan African nations. The heavy reliance on one part of a national export
weakens the state and makes it vulnerable to crisis associated with the commodity
because there is no diversification in the national market. Other sectors of nontraded goods within the economy are less developed and also don’t diversify which
bring in less revenues. A Dutch Disease is soon to follow as a result of relying on one
sector such as oil and gas and neglecting the development of other sectors. Sachs
and Warner (1995) indicate that resource abundant states dependent on their
resources will experience a low development rate compared to resource poor
countries who do not depend on resources. States become more rentier states
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where they rent most of their commodities and export in other sectors are low. The
more that is rented the less development takes place because an economy based on
commodity has less potential to expand in the long run compared to a
manufacturing and labor intensive market.43 An example would be is a state that
relies only on mineral exports while agriculture, fishing and especially
manufacturing make up a small percentage of the national GDP. The minerals will
run out eventually, what then.
There is also the lack of diversity in the economic sector. An Example would
be Angola’s agriculture sector. It only makes up 10 percent of the national GDP for
201344. States affected by the resource curse are generally rentier states where their
main national income is off the export of lucrative commodities such as precious
minerals. States rely heavily on one sector such as oil, gold, and diamond and as a
result depreciated other sectors of the economy causing the Dutch Disease. By
focusing and investing everything into one area, the risk of failure becomes larger. If
you place all your eggs in one basket and the basket breaks, all of your eggs are now
gone. States rely too heavily on their extractive industries to support themselves.
According to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and The
New York Times, Nigeria is the number one oil exporter on the African continent.
Per day, Nigeria exports 2.2 million barrels per day. Oil revenues make up 95
percent of exports and 75 percent of government revenue.45 Nigeria has been
exporting oil since the late 1960’s. Aside from the government officials relying on
Ibid - Sachs Warner (1995)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx
45 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm
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funds from oil revenues, the entire GDP relies on it since it makes up 95 percent of
exports. The agriculture sector is weak and low in annual revenues.
As a runner up, Angola is the second largest exporter of oil on the continent
right after Nigeria. According to the IMF and World Bank Group, oil revenues make
up 90% of all exports for Angola. It also accounts for 45% of the annual GDP. Oil
revenues make up 75% of government revenues.46 The state is heavily dependant
on its oil industry. Angola depends on oil to supplement other sectors of their
economy. Their annual agriculture sector only made up 10 percent of the GDP in
2013.47 National oil dependency must be reduced in order to develop other sectors
and export more in other goods than oil. Reducing the national reliance on a
commodity like oil reduces the chances of the state being affected by fluctuation in
the market.
Equatorial Guinea is the seventh largest oil exporting state in Africa. Though
it is not in the top five of oil producers in Africa, it is unique in size and population. It
only has a population of 757,000 but with a GDP of $ 15.58 billion for 2013.48 It is
not a member of OPEC. According to the U.S department of Energy Information
Administration, the oil and gas industry accounted for 95 percent of the GDP and 99
percent of the exports in 2011.49 Based on such numbers, it would be accurate to
assume that nearly all of Equatorial Guinea GDP and export revenue relies on the oil
and gas industry. Relying so heavily on one sector brings about vulnerability in
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other sectors. If the oil and gas market took a down turn for some time, the nation
will loose a significant amount of revenues.
So what does reliance on one sector mean for an economy? It means the
economy is going to suffer each time there is a fluctuation in the market. Also oil is
not a renewable energy source so eventually it will run out, what then if most of the
states exports are from non-renewable source. Like Gabon, these other nations will
face the same fate of dwindling resources. Just like the resource dry up, so will the
revenues and in turn affect the GDP negatively. A nations development is hindered
if the economy is not growing. There will be no jobs, there will be budget cuts from
the public sector that is already struggling and would need subsidies for basic
necessities.
Sachs and Warner (1995) sample various countries from around the world to
test whether or not the effects of natural resources have on economic growth. They
find that resource rich countries have higher levels of income but at the same time
have negative economic growth. The opposite would be resource poor countries
have lower income but higher growth in the long run. The main assumptions here is
that one, the resource abundance is temporary therefore will eventually dwindle
and the second is that resource abundant economies have an unsustainably high
level of income.50 An example of this would be Equatorial Guinea. The population is
under 1 million and the GDP per capita is $14,320 and yet 3 out of 4 people are
living in poverty.51
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), “Why do Resource- Abundant Economies Grow More
Slowly”
51 http://data.worldbank.org/country/equatorial-guinea
50
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Megan Clark states (2014):
“…Dependence on crude production leaves the country vulnerable to global oil
prices. Despite an IMF-supported Sovereign Wealth Fund and positive outlook for the
next few years, governance problems and a lack of other sector development will
continue to challenge development and has some observers dubious.”
At what rate can resource dependency be beneficial towards the state and
have a higher economic growth rate? Does resource dependency lead to resource
curse? The answer is not 100 percent clear, because there are many states like Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait that are oil dependent and yet there has not been a
resource curse. The assumption would be that it is a combination of factors such as
the level of dependency, good governance and access to the resource. There is
evidence that easily lootable resources affect state security. The assumption is that
states with resource that can easily be accessed by rebel groups will endure longer
conflict periods. An example would be diamonds in southern portions of Africa,
they are located in deep shaft mines making them hard to access without technical
know how and tools. Diamonds in western Africa are closer to the surface and can
easily be reached without the use of heavy machinery. Many rebel militia groups
have financed their organization by using such easy access diamond. Also, level of
governance and management of natural resource are a factor. A form of resource
management aside from overseeing exports and revenues is the resource-extracting
agents; MNCs. Multinational Corporations play a role in resource curse. This is not
to state that they are the cause as the true single cause can’t be identified but merely
a culprit.
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MNCs In LDCs
A Love Hate Relationship

The presence of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the developing world
is larger than ever. Foreign Direct Investments is exponentially increasing compared
to the past few years and are expected to grow larger as stated earlier on in the
paper. As FDI grows, the presence of MNCs in Less Developed Countries (LDCs)
increases. Corporations and their subsidiaries spread in developing countries, but
the relationship doesn’t always have the most positive outcome. The business
strategies of oil corporations bring large sums of capital to the host countries, but
they also bring of host of issues like environmental problems and social problems.
The idea of sustainable development has been around for over twenty years. While
some MNCs are forging sustainable development as part of their business goal, oil
and gas MNCs in Africa fall short of doing so. Why you may ask, because of lack of
corporate responsibility and enforcement of regulations.
The sustainable development argument breakdown into sub-categories for
MNCs in the oil and gas industry. These categories’ are climate change, biodiversity,
renewable energy and social investment. The achievement of these categories is
reliant on social pressure from either international institutions, governments or
NGO otherwise corporate responsibility is not a first response to MNCs in the oil
sector, it must be coercive. There has to be someone watching and requesting they
abide by international standards that are set like the Kyoto Protocol, an
international agreement where developed nations must reduce their Green House
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Gas (GHG) emissions by 5.2% by 2010. Even though social development and social
issues that are brought on by MNCs are part of the sustainable development
discussion, it is less a talked about subject since there are no major agencies
(regulators) pushing for this cause like there is for climate change and renewable
energy. Such neglect has caused sever damages to rural communities in oil rich
countries.
Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) state that according to Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) reports that corporations are degrading 60 percent
of the world’s ecosystem services.52 In the Niger Delta of Nigeria, the evidence of
MNC and its degradation of the environment are clear. Royal/Dutch had a large oil
spill in 2011 that was widely announced on most media outlets. According to Shell,
90 percent of the spill has been cleaned up. The remainder of the supposed 10
percent has made the land into a wasteland and is inhospitable to humans and
wildlife in the region. Oil exploration in the Niger Delta has been the main reason for
the major loss of ecosystems within the delta region. Such irresponsible corporate
behavior leads to severe environmental destructions that affect the native people
who live in the area. The is a lack of regulations on oil exploration and as a result,
MNC’s tend to disregard other issues except for the bottom line of revenues. Aside
from the environmental effects, indigenous people are loosing their homes and way
of life.
Ken Saro-WiWa was an indigenous activist for the Ogoni people in the Niger
Delta. Oil exploration in the region was driving out natives from their homeland due
Escobar & Vredenburg (2011), Multinational Oil Company’s and the Adaption of
sustainability p. 50
52
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to the dwindling resources caused by gas flares in the area. The Methane gas that is
released from the oil pipelines causes the air to be polluted and brings about health
issues. Oil spills and run offs’ also decimated the wildlife that was crucial to natives
gathering and growing food. Unfortunately for Ken Saro-Wiwa, he was executed by
the military on orders from the government.

Shell supported the military

government in order to secure its investments.
Aside from environmental degradation, MNC’s are often corrupt. Corrupt in
the sense where there have been large sums of pay offs for drilling licenses, land
rights and so forth. One prime example is the US company Cobalt International
Energy Inc in Angola. According to Forbes article, Cobalt had partnered with an
Angolan oil company Nazaki. A company that was later discovered to have been
secretly owned by state officials, state officials with records of large sums of
payment missing. The allegations are that oil tax revenues were being funneled to
the government. Angolan law states that no politician can have ownership of state
and private enterprise. The loophole is that this law doesn’t cover politician’s
friends and therefore politicians can benefit indirectly. Though Cobalt argued it had
no knowledge of the owner of Nazaki since Sonangol assigned it to Cobalt. Such
negligence by oil corporations only shows the lack of transparency between
government agencies and oil corporations. Frances Copolla states that according to
the Open Source Initiative Report (2011):53

“…Multinational oil companies do not address governance or transparency issues in
Angola. The companies’ continued transactions with the government – without calling
53

Frances Coppola (2014), “Cobalt International Energy: Oil, Angola, Corruption”
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the terms of the transactions into question – have facilitated patronage problems, rent
seeking and exacerbated the resource curse. Some exceptions exist, but these rare
efforts are not industry wide. Companies tout their CSR projects, but these projects
often lack community input, and never address transparency and human rights issues.
In relation to the mitigation of impacts, multinationals get almost a free pass. There
have been some efforts to hold multinationals to account, particularly through homecountry anti-corruption instruments and civil society advocacy, but these need to be
ramped up.”
Corruption and bribery runs rampant in states with low development and
high commodities. Oil companies are known to pay bribes and give expensive lavish
gifts to leaders and government officials in return for favorable deals in oil licenses.
In 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act outlawed bribery of any company to
foreign officials. This was in response to an investigation that turned up more than
400 US companies had made illegal payments to governments in foreign countries.54
In the case of Equatorial Guinea, corruption reaches to the President. Walter
International Inc was financially supporting President Teodoro Obiang’s son to
attend Pepperdine University in California. According to Bloom’s article, nearly fifty
thousand dollars a year was being spent on Obiang’s son. Soon after, large
companies such as ExxonMobil and Texaco were drilling for oil off shore. Such
business practices are all too common in the oil industry across Africa. Oil
companies are willing to bribe and spoil government officials and their families

54

Justin Bloom (2004), “U.S Oil Firms Entwined in Equatorial Guinea Deals”
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rather than invest in social programs that would be considered as legitimate
business practices.
Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) examine the adaptability of sustainable
development within the oil and gas sector. Though there is an argument that social
investment is unlikely by MNCs because it goes against their business strategies.
They find that it is not impossible for MNCs to adapt sustainable development as
part of their strategies. The mechanism would be normative isomorphism, where is
one does it and shows that it is financially fit for the business, others will follow suit.
A social investment doesn’t mean buying temporary items for a village or paying a
fee but forming a long-term commitment in the community and enabling the
community to develop and prosper. The oil is the commodity that companies are
profiting from and should in return invest in the region.
Multinational Corporations are violating the land they seek to profit from and
also displacing people from their natural homes such as the Ogoniland residents.
Such violation spiral an already weak state and system into resource curse. The
state is not fully capable of monitoring MNCs behavior and in some cases; politicians
are also in business with the MNCs and are equally causing the problem at hand
while the few minority benefits. There are many cases across the African oil
industries where bribery and profiteering take place. State officials should consider
the long-term effect of corruption for their citizen because while they profit, the
people suffer.
Multinational Corporations are positioning themselves to profit from
resources in such area without the return of social development. I can’t simply
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assign all responsibility to the MNC as they are a business entity and the main goal is
to make money. However, the state should have regulations that require the MNCs
to adhere to in order to continue business and profit. Oil drilling license renewals
and approvals should be based on ethics rather than side payments. The MNC and
state are both responsible where as the MNCs is the extracting agent and the state is
the regulating agent.
The lists below give an idea as to which oil corporation are operating in
each country. You will notice an overlap of similar companies in all three nations.

In Nigeria
Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited
Chevron Nigeria Ltd
Texaco Overseas Nig. Petroleum Co. Unltd
Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited
Philip & Pan Ocean Oil Corporation
Bought Over Ashland Oil Nigeria Limited
Agip Energy & Natural Resources
Statoil/ BP Aliance
Esso Exploration & Production Nig. Ltd
Texaco Outer Shelf Nigeria Limited
Total (Nig.) Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd.
Amoco Corporation
Chevron Exploration& Production Co
Conoco
Abacan
*Source for data
http://www.nipc.gov.ng/intcomp.html

In Angola:

Exxon Mobil
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Chevron Corp
Texaco
BP ( UK)
Sonangol
Plus Petrol ( Peru)
Somoil (Angolan private firm)
Marathon Oil
Elf Aquitaine
Eni (Italy)
Petrobras ( Brazil)
Sinopec (china)
Maersk Oil (2006)
AGIP ANGOLA LTD
BP ANGOLA
CABINDA GULF OIL COMPANY LTD. (CABGOC)
CNR (RANGER OIL LTD)
*Data Source
http://www.omnimap.com/catalog/int/angola-gas.htm

In Equatorial Guinea:
Ge Petrol
Sonagas
Novamark
Elegance
G3 Oleo E Gas
Mobil
Exxon Mobil
Xuan Energy Limited
Marathon Oil
*Data Source
http://www.equatorialoil.com/Petroleum_Exploration_history.html

Corruption, High GDP and Poverty
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Listed are a few numbers to put corruption into perspective along with how
high GDP’s can be and yet still have larger amount of the population in poverty.
Table. A
Country

Transparency Int’l Corruption Index
2014

Qatar
69
Botswana
63
Bahrain
49
Kuwait
44
Niger
35
Nigeria
27
Angola
19
Venezuela
19
Equatorial Guinea
*N/A
*Data Source: Transparency International Corruption Index 2014
The scoring ranges from 1-100. One being the most corrupt and 100 being the least
corrupt. I have arranged the states in order from the least to the most corrupt
according to Transparency International. Each state is also an oil-exporting nation.
Table. B
Country

GDP in 2014

Nigeria
$568 Billion
Qatar
$211.8 Billion
Botswana
$15.81 Billion
Angola
$131.4 Billion
Eq. Guinea
$14.3 Billion
Bahrain
$33.87 Billion
*Data Source: World Bank Data Bank

Primary School
Attendance 2014
85%
103%
108%
104%
91%
104%

Poverty level
46%
none
19.3%
36.6%
76.8%
none

Table B represents the extremely high GDP attached with high poverty rates. The
nations with the largest percentage of their population in poverty have suffered
from the resource curse. All states listed are rentier states.
The Curious Case of Kuwait
Resource Blessing Not A Curse
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Today, Kuwait has a population of 3.479 million as of 2014 with a GDP of $
175.8 billion. 55 Kuwait city, which is the capital of Kuwait, is the oldest and original
larger settlement of Kuwait. Bedouin and pastoral Arab tribes from the Arabian
Peninsula moved across the dessert and Kuwait City was born. The city was
segmented between the elite ruling families descending from tribes and merchants
as the businessmen of the city. The lower class were the laborers. The economy was
mainly fishing, pearling, shipbuilding and trading of goods. The laborers and some
slaves from the African continent worked in this sector.
Ruling families can be identified as ethnic Arabs and Sunni. Based on this
distinction the two most powerful families were the Al-Sabah and the Al-Khalifa.
Due to a disagreement the families had a falling out which led to the Al-Khalifa
moving out of Kuwait city and eventually ending up in Bahrain. The family still rules
Bahrain till this day. The Al-Sabah family became the chosen ruling family of Kuwait
starting 1752.
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The Al- Sabah family is still the ruling family today and will most

likely remain this way for generations to come.
The structure of the government is strictly for the royal family. The cabinet is
chosen from the royal family and elite merchant families with ties to the royal family
from intermarriage. They make up the elite ruling first class citizens of Kuwait.

http://data.worldbank.org/country/kuwait
Meshaal Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah. (2013) “Recourse Curse Reduction Through
Innovation: A blessing for all, the case of Kuwait.”
55
56
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In 1899 Kuwait became a proctor of Britain. The move came after Sheik
Mubarak Al- Sabah requested the aid of the British Empire. Britain did comply with
joy to fend of any other European including German interest using the Gulf Port. 57
During this period, Britain and Kuwait had a cliency relationship, Kuwait being the
client. Cliency is described by Mark Gasiorowski, as a strategic relationship between
a strong state and a weak state where goods are exchanged for security services.
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Britain would offer security assistance against any internal and external threats.
Externally, Iraq as a next-door neighbor always flirted with state borderlines and
wanting to claim Kuwait as a province of Iraq based on old tribal beleifs.
Mubarak requests aid from Britain to aid in border security between Iraq and
Kuwait. Mubarak also known as “Mubarak the Great” ascended into power after
murdering his two brothers. Muhammad was the ruler and Jarrah was his closest
advisor. It is described that Mubarak was encouraged to take place instead of his
brother to slow down the “Iraqization” of Kuwait.

Mubarak assassinated his

brothers and took power and ruled from 1896-1915 as one of the most feared rulers
in Kuwait. 59
Oil was first discovered in 1938 during oil exploration drillings led by BP and
Gulf Oil which is now Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) after it nationalized in 1975.
However, the first oil shipment didn’t take place until 1946. As Japanese cultured
pearls saturated the market and ships were being built in the industrialized
European region, Kuwait now had a new resource to depend upon that would prove
MERIP. (1975). “ Kuwait”
Mary Ann Te´treault. (1991). “Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State.”
59 Ibid
57
58
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to be more lucrative than pearling and shipbuilding. In 1946 Kuwait’s oil income
was $ 760,000. 60 Kuwait gained its independence from Britain on June 19, 1961. As
a strong state, post independent Kuwait created the “Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone”
in 1964. This allowed the state to use oil funds for state development. A water
distillation and electricity plant were built as well as the expansion of ports and
manufacturing items like chlorine, cement and asphalt. As part of the redistribution
of oil funds, there was also a large scale expansion on education programs,
healthcare and housing privileges afforded to Kuwaiti citizens. In the 1950’s the top
three main portions of the national budget went to public works, education and
healthcare expansion.
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Healthcare and education (up to university level) are free

for Kuwaiti citizens. Under the new welfare state, population in Kuwait tripled from
1957-1975 from 113,622 to 470,123. 62
Today Kuwait’s oil and gas sector makes up for 60 percent of the national
GDP and 95 percent of export revenues. Kuwait oil field produces about 3.2 million
barrels per day.
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The national GDP stands at $175.8 billion for 2013 according to

the World Bank. Kuwait continues to state build and provide a formidable social
welfare system for its population using their oil revenues.
The major reasons resource curse occurs is the lack of resource
management that don’t translate into national advancement. Kuwait has been
building its internal infrastructure and social welfare system since they began
Shafeeq Ghabra. (1997). “Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change”.
Meshaal Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah. (2013) “Recourse Curse Reduction Through
Innovation: A blessing for all, the case of Kuwait.” P.27
62 Ibid-- Shafeeq Ghabra. (1997).
63 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/165.htm
60
61
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exporting oil. It has also been expanding to become more diverse and not so
dependent solely on oil revenues. Kuwait manufactures building materials for
homes, cement, chlorine and also asphalt. This is small in comparison to oil but yet
an important sector that aids Kuwait in exploring different economic avenues for
revenues.
Like other oil exporting nations there are foreign oil corporations that are
involved in Kuwait. These are the major oil companies that are across the globe in
many states, including the African nations previously discussed. Figure one list all
major foreign oil company involvement in Kuwait.

Kuwait:
Bristish Petroleum Co. Plc
Chevron
Getty Oil. Co
Gulf Oil
Japan’s Arabian Oil Co
Mobil Corp.
Royal Dutch/ Shell
Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd
Texaco
Total
*Data Source http://www.virginia.edu/igpr/APAG/apagoilcompany.html
Unlike in my three cases Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, there is no
previous work or articles that mention MNC corruption in Kuwait. I find it ironic
that the same companies found in Africa behave differently in the Persian Gulf. Is it
safe to assume perhaps there are stricter monitoring and regulations in Kuwait
versus in Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea? Meshaal Jaber points out on page
71 figure 3.6 Kuwait’s scores as assessed by Transparency International 2013
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report. Kuwait scores 116 out of 163. The scale indicates one being the worst and
163 being the least. Just one year later Transparency International Corruption
Index report shows that Kuwait has improved significantly 2014. Kuwait scores a
44 out of 100. One being the worst and 100 being the least corrupt. Based on this
assessment Kuwait is working its way to being less corrupt and having good
governance. This was not the case in 2005. According to an IMF report presented by
Meeshal Jaber, among resource rich countries governance scale, Kuwait lay smack in
the middle of bad governance and good governance.

Since then Kuwait has

tremendously improved its track record for governance and social investment.
Though Kuwait is not a democratic nation, it manages to have a sense of good
governance among its people. There is clear indication that oil revenues have
benefited the state and the citizens in the form of free education and healthcare.
Also low-income housing are available through the government. Though oil
accounts for majority of exports, it is not the only revenue. Kuwait is expanding and
developing a technology sector and skill sector with its high rate of university
graduates. Since the exporting of oil, Kuwait has used the windfall of excess capital
to build its self from a sustenance society to a high income one in matter of 50 years.
Kuwait like Botswana hasn’t suffered a resource curse because they manage their
resource blessings with good policies and accountability. The population is also
directly successful due to the behavior of the state. In the end, the state will always
be responsible for the welfare of its people as it is the sovereign ruler within its
borders.
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Summary
In summary, resource curse is the result of mismanagement of natural
resource. The resource is not the curse but the way it is managed. The same
resource has been identified in four different nations across two continents. Oil
doesn’t seem to have the same negative effects in Kuwait as it does in Angola,
Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. The variables of government, economic dependency
and MNCs were clearly identified in all four. The difference lies within these
variables. In states where governance is weak with high rates of corruption along
with minimal social investment and state building, resource curse is present.
Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have extremely high levels of
corruption that basically hinder development. State funds are continuously
unaccounted for and billions of dollars simply vanish. There is no investment into
building infrastructures and creating a social welfare program. Majority of the
population in corrupt states still live in poverty with no access to healthcare,
education (post primary school) or housing. However, Kuwait presents a good
example of what good governance and management of resource wealth looks like.
Kuwait maintains a good governance track record (as pointed out by Transparency
International) with good policies. It invests oil revenues into building state
infrastructures,

by

providing

free

education,

healthcare

and

housing

accommodations. It is also diversifying its economy by manufacturing chemicals and
investing into the tech industry.
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Commodity dependency also creates a weakness in the economy. It becomes
extremely vulnerable to volatile price fluctuations. There is also the ever-present
reality that these resources will eventually tap out. At that point if the state hasn’t
made other investments to cover itself from the decline and loss of a sector, the
internal economy will suffer greatly and head towards a crash. By relying solely on
one sector, states neglect to explore and develop other economic avenues that could
earn them revenues. Resource curse becomes a likelihood reality for resource
dependent states

as other sectors of their economy continue to depreciate.

Botswana was one nation mentioned several times throughout many working
papers during my research. Apparently, there was the stereotype assumption that
all African resource rich countries are headed to resource curse due to
patrimonialism. Botswana was brought up several times across many articles as an
example that this assumption was not true. Botswana has an abundant supply of
diamonds but it is not their only source of revenue. By diversifying into agriculture
and tourism, Botswana has evaded the resource curse. Also Botswana scores better
than Kuwait on the Transparency Corruption Index report. Their government is
transparent in state fund management and as a result the government is more
accountable towards its actions.
Lastly, the Multi National Corporations (MNCs) play a role in resource curse
only in states where there is no or little policy governing their actions. It would be a
far reach to entirely blame all of the problems on MNCs as the new imperials within
a state. However, they are not free of blame either in places like the Niger Delta.
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They may not be the main cause of resource curse but they are a culprit in the
process. How you may ask. Well let’s look at Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial; there is
clear evidence of corruption within in MNCs ranging from oil spills that are still not
fully cleaned up to bribery and funding rebel groups in hopes of better oil contracts
once the rebels take over the government. However, in the same breath the same
companies that are caught red handed behaving in an appalling manner, do not
misbehave in Kuwait. Is there a different sort of respect for the Arabian nation and
leader? I don’t know but I do find that there are strict policies within Kuwait on
MNCs and it becomes in their best interest to abide by the rules and conduct
themselves in a corporate responsible way.
Places like Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have very little policies
governing MNC’s causing them to show their true greedy and careless ways. There
can be no other explanation for their behavior in the same industry on two
continents. I doubt African leaders are forcing them to act corrupt, they are more a
less following the leader.
Without the reduction of corruption on state level, the rest of the variables
follow a domino effect. The state is the primary actor, the more accountable they are
the less corrupt they become. With less corruption and better management of funds
the better the state develops. The more the nation develops the better the regulating
policies are designed. The better policies in place the less corrupt MNCs become. It
is all on the same equation. The curse lies with the management and not the
resource. Accountability, transparency and good governance can cure and curb
resource curse.
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